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INTRODUCTION

Every day millions of individuals worldwide depend on the Global
Positioning System (GPS) to provide location, timing, and navigational
services.1 While GPS provides many significant benefits to society, the
scope and detail of the information that law enforcement can collect using
GPS creates individual privacy risks because its use may impinge on
individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights to be free from search and seizures.2
Law enforcement officials describe GPS devices as an efficient, safe,
and accurate way to track vehicle movement and laud the quality of
information the devices gather.3 The information law enforcement officials
collect using GPS tracking devices creates a highly credible and permanent
record of evidence for criminal prosecutions.4 Furthermore, as the cost of
GPS use becomes more affordable, law enforcement agencies will use GPS
more frequently.5
Despite the growing use of GPS in law enforcement investigations, few
laws restrict the government’s use of GPS tracking.6 The Supreme Court
has yet to examine the constitutionality of governmental use of GPS

1. See Global Positioning System: Serving the World, GPS.GOV,
http://www.gps.gov/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2011) (indentifying what constitutes the
global positioning system).
2. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 221 (Wash. 2003) (showing that the
use of GPS technology allowed law enforcement to locate the body of a missing child);
Robert Galvin, Bomb Reconstruction Training: Post-Blast Practice, 37 L.
ENFORCEMENT TECH. 52, 54-59 (2010) (explaining that GPS technology allows police
officers to better provide evidence to a jury); Richard Winton, LAPD Pursues HighFeb.
3,
2006,
Tech
End
to
High-Speed
Chases,
L.A. TIMES,
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/03/local/me-bratton3 (noting the LAPD’s use of
GPS dart guns to track automobiles as an alternative to high-speed chases).
3. See Keith Hodges, Tracking “Bad Guys”: Legal Considerations in Using GPS,
76 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 25, 25 (2007) (detailing how GPS devices benefit law
enforcement).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006) (excluding GPS surveillance from privacy
protection in the statute); see also Hodges, supra note 3, at 26 (elaborating on the lack
of protections afforded by federal statutes and the resulting benefits to law
enforcement).
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devices under the Fourth Amendment.7 The United States Congress has
also refrained from limiting law enforcement’s investigatory uses of GPS
devices.8
In United States v. Maynard, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that police use of GPS tracking devices without a
warrant is an unconstitutional search.9 The Maynard decision differed
from other circuit court decisions in which courts held that warrantless
police use of GPS devices did not constitute a search.10 Maynard’s holding
is significant because it established the rule that the police use of GPS
devices is a search and, therefore, implicates Fourth Amendment
protections.11 As GPS technology raises important Fourth Amendment
concerns, the Supreme Court will likely clarify the constitutionality of law
enforcement’s GPS use. 12
GPS devices involve evolving technology within our modern society.13
The unresolved question is whether privacy law can keep up with this
technological advancement.14
7. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1983) (noting that the Court
left open the question of comprehensive sustained monitoring in deciding the case);
see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (highlighting
the Supreme Court’s distinction between a discrete and limited search such as a beeper
and sustained monitoring or “mass surveillance”), cert. granted sub nom. United States
v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006) (specifically excluding “any communication from
a tracking device” from the privacy protections afforded by the act).
9. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (declaring the police search unreasonable and in
violation of the Fourth Amendment).
10. See, e.g., id. at 558 (holding that the warrantless use of GPS by the police
constituted a search); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir.
2010) (ruling that the police did not conduct an impermissible search of the defendant’s
car by monitoring his location with mobile tracking devices); United States v.
Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding the GPS installation reasonable
because it was not random, arbitrary, invasive, and did not track private places); United
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (ruling that using GPS is the
equivalent to following a car and is not a search).
11. See Charlie Savage, Judges Divide over Rising GPS Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2010, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/14/us/14gps.html
(noting that the issue is whether warrantless GPS tracking violates the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches).
12. See H.W. PERRY JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 251 (1991) (“A circuit split is not simply a formal criterion
for cert.; it is probably the single most important criterion . . . .”); see also Spencer S.
Hsu, Appeals Court Limits Use of GPS to Track Suspects, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2010,
at
A4,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/08/06/AR2010080604946.html (proclaiming that the D.C.
Circuit opinion has cleared the way for Supreme Court review of the issue of
warrantless GPS tracking for an extended period of time).
13. See Global Positioning System: Serving the World, GPS.GOV,
http://www.gps.gov/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2011) (noting the vast uses of GPS).
14. See, e.g., Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up In Knotts? GPS Technology and
the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 411-13 (2007) [hereinafter Tied up in
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Part II of this comment examines the Supreme Court’s privacy
framework that controlled the decisions of the circuit courts and illuminates
the divided nature of both state and federal courts on the issue of
warrantless GPS tracking.15 Part III argues that United States v. Knotts
should not be controlling in cases of continuous and prolonged GPS
monitoring.16 Part III further contends that the D.C. Circuit Court’s use of
the “mosaic theory” presents a new workable theory for Fourth
Amendment analysis.17 This Comment finally considers the policy
implications of evolving technology and the Fourth Amendment with a
focus on the disparate impact of the issue on Muslim Americans.18
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Supreme Court and the Evolution of Privacy Jurisprudence
Several significant Supreme Court decisions specifically address the
issue of technology and its implications for an individual’s Fourth
Amendment right to privacy.19 Katz v. United States articulated the twopart standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment stating that an individual must have a subjective expectation
of privacy that society finds reasonable.20 The decision also establishes
that what an individual seeks to preserve as private, even in a public area,
may have constitutional protections.21 Courts have used this standard to
Knotts?] (explaining the status of the Fourth Amendment interpretations and evolving
technology).
15. See infra Part II (framing the Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence and
noting the lower courts review of GPS tracking).
16. See infra Part III.A (arguing that the Supreme Court specifically excluded
prolonged monitoring from the issues decided in Knotts, making the case an unsuitable
precedent).
17. See infra Part III.B (arguing that the mosaic theory, which postulates that
discrete pieces of information when combined together, adopt a new significance based
on the collective picture the information presents, is a workable test in examining
evolving technology and privacy).
18. See infra Part IV (noting the current issues related to government GPS use and
Muslim Americans).
19. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001) (holding that information
obtained by thermal imaging of a suspect’s home constituted a search); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (deciding that police use of a beeper on a drum in a
suspect’s vehicle was not a search as there was no reasonable expectation of privacy);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (delineating
the required elements to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy).
20. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (comparing how people have
a subjective expectation of privacy for a conversation in their home but not outside the
home where others can overhear).
21. See id. at 351 (reiterating that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places, and that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
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analyze subsequent privacy jurisprudence.22
Another seminal Supreme Court decision on the nature of privacy came
in United States v. Knotts.23 In Knotts, police planted a beeper in a
container of chemicals before the suspect purchased the container and
placed it in his vehicle.24 The police used the beeper to trace the vehicle to
a cabin owned by one of the suspects and obtained a warrant to search the
premises.25 The Court focused on the diminished expectation of privacy in
a vehicle that travels on public roadways and found that the beeper
surveillance was not a search.26 In Knotts, the suspect’s argument centered
on the police monitoring, and not on the installation of the beeper as a
search.27
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of evolving technology and
privacy again, in Kyllo v. United States.28 In Kyllo, the government
suspected Kyllo of growing marijuana in his home and used a thermal
imaging device from outside Kyllo’s home to detect radiation from the
marijuana cultivation lamps.29 The Court held that because the device was
not in general public use and because the search explored details of the
home that were previously unknowable without intrusion, the act
constituted a search that required a warrant.30

preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”).
22. See, e.g., Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280 (accepting the Court’s holding in Katz as
controlling).
23. Id. at 281 (finding that a person has a diminished expectation of privacy in his
vehicle and the use of a beeper to follow the person does not change that expectation).
24. See id. at 277-78 (explaining that police used a radio transmitter beeper without
a warrant and without the consent of the suspect to collect locational information).
25. See id. at 278-79 (highlighting how the police warrant allowed the police to
search the cabin, where they found a methamphetamine laboratory that they used to
convict the suspect).
26. See id. at 281, 285 (“A person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
place to another.”).
27. See id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (predicting that the case would have
been more difficult to decide had the suspect challenged the beeper’s original
installation and detailing the holding in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 50912 (1961), which finds that if “the government does engage in physical intrusion of a
constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment even if the same information could
have been obtained by other means”).
28. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (clarifying that the use of a
thermal heat detector presumptively violated a person’s right to privacy in his home).
29. See id. at 29-30 (explaining that evidence from the thermal scan of the home
provided evidence to procure a warrant which led to Kyllo’s indictment).
30. See id. at 40 (instructing that the search was presumptively unreasonable
without a warrant).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011

5

FORD 9/25/2011

10/6/2011 12:52:22 PM

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 18

1356

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 19:4

B. Warrantless GPS Tracking and the Lower Courts
Multiple circuit courts have addressed the issue of warrantless GPS
tracking.31 Various courts have specifically examined the issue of law
enforcement’s installation and use of GPS tracking devices on an
automobile without a warrant in the course of a police investigation.32 The
court in United States v. Garcia coined the term “wholesale surveillance”
to refer to the new technologies that might allow law enforcement officials
an unprecedented ease and scope of surveillance.33 The decision warned
that advancements in surveillance technology presented considerable
threats to privacy but stated that the court did not need to resolve that
momentous issue.34 Recent decisions in United States v. Marquez and
United States v. Pineda-Moreno represent a similar desire to avoid the
constitutional scrutiny involved in ruling that a search occurred.35 The
Marquez decision echoed the concerns over wholesale surveillance, yet the
court refused to find the warrantless use of the GPS tracker a search.36 The
decision focused on the non-invasive nature of GPS trackers on an
automobile, and the fact that police installed the GPS tracker after the
suspect had parked the vehicle on a public road.37 The court in PinedaMoreno also referred to Garcia in finding that the warrantless use of a GPS
tracking device did not constitute a search.38 In Pineda-Moreno, police
31. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that
the warrantless use of a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s automobile constituted a
search and violated the Fourth Amendment), cert. granted sub nom. United States v.
Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259); United States v. Pineda-Moreno,
591 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010) (ruling that the warrantless use of a GPS tracking
device on a suspect’s automobile was not a search); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d
604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010) (deciding that the warrantless use of a GPS tracking device on
a suspect’s automobile did not constitute a search); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d
994, 997-96 (7th Cir. 2007) (resolving that the use of a GPS tracking device on an
automobile by law enforcement did not constitute a search).
32. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 549; Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1213; Marquez, 605
F.3d at 607; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 995.
33. See Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998 (using the term “wholesale surveillance” to explain
the capabilities of surveillance that new technology offers law enforcement officials).
34. See id. (emphasizing the importance of judicial review of wholesale
surveillance).
35. See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217 (concluding that monitoring the
suspect’s automobile with the GPS device was not a law enforcement search);
Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610 (finding that the GPS device “merely allowed the police to
reduce the cost of lawful surveillance” and did not constitute a search).
36. See Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610 (quoting Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998, and adding
that as technology advances, law enforcement’s ability to undertake massive and
possibly arbitrary GPS data collection is a concern).
37. See id. (focusing on the public nature of the road to imply that people have
lower expectations of privacy on the road).
38. See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997)
(“[F]ollowing a car on a public street . . . is unequivocally not a search within the
meaning of the amendment.”).
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officers attached a tracking device while the car was parked in the suspect’s
driveway.39 The court reasoned that because the suspect did not take steps
to exclude individuals from his driveway, he did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the driveway, and the use of the tracking device
fell short of a search.40
The D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Maynard represents a significant
jurisprudential shift regarding the consideration of GPS tracking as a
search.41 The court in Maynard rejected the holdings of the other circuit
courts and held that the police use of GPS tracking constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment.42
In addition to the federal courts, state courts remain divided on the issue
of governmental use of warrantless GPS tracking.43 State legislatures have
attempted to create a clear guideline by enacting statutes that impose
criminal penalties for GPS tracking and mandate the exclusion of GPS data
evidence obtained without a warrant.44 The disparity in the law at both the
state and federal levels further increases the likelihood that the Supreme
Court will review the issue in order to provide greater consistency and
prevent geographical injustice.45

39. See id. at 1214 (repeating the suspect’s argument that the police violated his
privacy when they entered his driveway to access his car).
40. See id. at 1215 (proclaiming that the suspect’s lack of active exclusion, such as
barriers or enclosures, of others from the suspect’s driveway negated his reasonable
expectation of privacy in the space).
41. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555-56 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding
that Knotts is not controlling and the warrantless use of a GPS tracking device on a
suspect’s automobile was a search that violated the Fourth Amendment), cert. granted
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259).
42. See id. at 557-58 (rejecting the holdings in Pineda-Moreno, Marquez, and
Garcia and noting that each court reserved the issue of whether “wholesale”
surveillance requires a warrant).
43. Compare Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369-70 (Mass. 2009)
(holding that GPS installation constituted a seizure), People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d
1195, 1201 (N.Y. 2009) (requiring a warrant for the installation and use of a GPS
device in the absence of exigent circumstances), and State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217,
221-24 (Wash. 2003) (deciding that the use of a GPS device constituted a search), with
Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002) (determining that GPS tracking did not
constitute an unreasonable search and seizure), and State v. Sveum, 769 N.W.2d 53, 60
(Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that no search occurred when the police used GPS to
track a vehicle while in public view).
44. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.31, 934.42 (West 2010) (mandating that
police acquire a warrant before installing a mobile tracking device); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 626A.35, 626A.37 (West 2010) (requiring a court order for the use of any mobile
tracking device); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-13, 77-23a-15.5 (LexisNexis 2010)
(commanding that police acquire a warrant before using a mobile tracking device).
45. PERRY, supra note 12, at 250 (stating that Supreme Court review is likely as it
will be equitable to have a clear Supreme Court ruling instead of conflicting circuit
court opinions).
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United States v. Maynard

Facts

During the course of a drug investigation, law enforcement officials
placed a GPS tracking device on Antoine Jones’ Jeep, which tracked Jones’
movements twenty-four hours a day for twenty-eight days.46 In the District
Court, Jones argued that while police had an order for the installation of the
device, there was a lack of probable cause, the order had expired before
police installed the device, and the police attached the device outside of the
issuing court’s jurisdiction.47 The District Court held that the government
was not required to obtain a court order or a search warrant to install a GPS
device on a vehicle.48 The District Court suppressed the GPS data that
police collected while Jones’ car remained in his garage.49 The District
Court convicted Antoine Jones and Lawrence Maynard of conspiracy to
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine base.50
2.

Opinion

The Circuit Court consolidated the appeals of Maynard and Jones, and
after finding that none of the joint issues warranted reversal, focused on
Jones’ individual argument.51 The court rejected the government’s
contention that Knotts was controlling, specifically pointing to the Supreme
Court’s distinction between the limited information collected by a beeper
during a single discrete journey, and more comprehensive sustained
monitoring.52 The Circuit Court applied a Katz analysis and determined
that unlike movement in a single journey, the totality of an individual’s
movements over the period of a month is not actually exposed to the
46. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part sub nom. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert.
granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 101259); see also Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 & n.* (detailing how the continuous
surveillance discovered the totality and pattern of Jones’ movements for the month).
47. See Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71 (noting that the Government contended that even
if it did not issue a warrant, Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
vehicle that would prevent the installation of the GPS device).
48. See id. (referring to the holding in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715
(1984), where the Supreme Court excluded evidence that police collected while the
beeper was in a private residence because of the reasonable expectation of privacy in
the home).
49. See id.
50. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 548.
51. See id. at 549.
52. See id. at 555-56 (emphasizing the Supreme Court’s reservation of whether a
warrant would be required in the case of twenty four hour surveillance or “drag-net”
surveillance and noting the single 100-mile trip involved in Knotts).
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public, because the chance of anyone observing all of the movements is
extremely unlikely.53
The court also applied the mosaic theory, which posits that discrete
pieces of information when combined together, adopt a new significance
based on the collective picture the information presents.54 In applying this
theory of information, the court held that an individual does not
constructively expose the whole of his or her movements.55
The government typically advances the mosaic theory in Freedom of
Information Act cases.56 This theory has increased in prominence since the
September 11, 2001 attacks.57 The D.C. Circuit Court used the mosaic
theory to justify an individual’s expectation of privacy in his or her
continuous and prolonged movements.58
This theory provides an
interesting option in addressing the current dilemma that courts face in
attempting to reconcile Fourth Amendment interests with evolving
technology.59
The D.C. Circuit Court determined that society recognized Jones’
expectation of privacy in all of his movements over the course of a month,
and that utilizing a GPS device without a warrant in order to monitor his
movements defeated his reasonable expectation of privacy.60 The court
reversed Jones’ conviction because the court found that the police procured

53. Id. at 560.
54. See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972) (defining

the mosaic theory by stating that “[t]he significance of one item of information may
frequently depend upon knowledge of many other items of information. What may
seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad
view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper
context.”).
55. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 (“The difference is not one of degree but of kind,
for no single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the distinction between a
day in the life and a way of life . . . .”).
56. See David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom
of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630 (2005) (outlining the history of the
government’s use of the mosaic theory).
57. See id. at 631 (explaining that while not all courts have sanctioned the mosaic
theory, several high profile rulings have used the mosaic theory to sustain government
secrecy).
58. See also Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562-63 (using the mosaic theory to find that
prolonged surveillance implicates privacy in a way that discrete surveillance does not).
59. See generally Julian Sanchez, GPS Tracking and a “Mosaic Theory” of
Government Searches, CATO @ LIBERTY (Aug. 11, 2010, 9:22 PM), http://www.catoat-liberty.org/gps-tracking-and-a-mosaic-theory-of-government-searches/
(acknowledging that judges could use the mosaic theory to address the issue of
technology and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
60. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (“A person does not leave his privacy behind
when he walks out his front door” and that the application of Katz leads to the
conclusion that society recognizes the privacy in an individual’s total movements in a
month).
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evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment.61
Following the release of the decision, the prosecution petitioned for a
rehearing en banc in the D.C. Circuit Court, which the court denied.62 The
case was further appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari.63
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court Should Use Jones to Examine the Issue It Reserved
in Knotts and Affirm the D.C. Circuit Court’s Decision That Knotts Does
Not Control In Cases Involving Comprehensive and Sustained
Surveillance.
The Court in Knotts specifically reserved the issue of twenty-four hour
or “dragnet” surveillance when it examined the Fourth Amendment
implications of warrantless police use of a beeper.64 Subsequent lower
court decisions relied on Knotts to uphold warrantless prolonged GPS
surveillance even though the Court had limited its holding to exclude this
type of surveillance.65
These decisions distinguished wholesale
surveillance, which the Seventh Circuit described as police using GPS to
track thousands of cars at random, from prolonged surveillance of an
individual.66 In Maynard, the court noted that the Supreme Court decision
in Knotts clearly referred to prolonged surveillance of an individual as the
Court was responding to the defendant’s argument regarding surveillance
of an individual.67 The Court’s language in Knotts indicates that the Court
61. Id. at 568.
62. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc

denied, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying the petition for a rehearing en banc in a
5 to 4 vote).
63. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub
nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259).
64. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (“[I]f such dragnet type
law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will
be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be
applicable.”).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010) (using
Knotts to reason that an automobile traveling from one place to another has no
reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212,
1216-17 (9th Cir. 2010) (relying on Knotts to hold that the use of a GPS device did not
constitute an impermissible search); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th
Cir. 2007) (noting that the Court in Knotts held that use of a beeper was not a search).
66. See Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998; see also Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557 (outlining that
the circuit courts had misinterpreted the question reserved in Knotts as only applying to
mass surveillance).
67. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556 (describing the defendant’s argument that
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible, without
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reserved the issue of prolonged individual surveillance for the future. This
makes Knotts unacceptable precedent for questions involving the
warrantless and continuous GPS tracking of individuals.68
Knotts also signifies that persons traveling on public roads in their
vehicles lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements from
one location to another.69 This case indicates that a person lacks a
reasonable expectation of privacy in discrete trips, such as a single trip;
however this case does not indicate that individuals lack a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the totality of their movements.70 The police in
Maynard used GPS technology to track Jones’ movements continuously for
a month, not simply from one location to another.71 Consequently, the rule
derived in Knotts did not apply and should not control cases of prolonged
GPS monitoring because the rule implicates a discrete trip rather than
prolonged monitoring.72
GPS devices are considerably more intrusive than the beeper used in
Knotts and warrant independent judicial privacy analysis.73 When law
enforcement investigators use beepers, they must use visual surveillance,
beepers, or sense-augmenting equipment in order to track the suspect.74
Beepers malfunction in inclement weather and require immense financial
and manpower investment.75 GPS devices, on the other hand, provide a
minute-by-minute record of surveillance, can be used in any weather
condition, are not labor-intensive or expensive for police to use, and do not
require constant visual surveillance to track a signal.76 Knotts involved the
use of significantly less invasive technology, and therefore should not
control cases involving GPS devices as the use of GPS devices allows for
prolonged and highly intimate intrusions into individuals’ privacy.77
judicial knowledge or supervision.”).
68. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283-84 (reserving the issue of twenty-four hour
surveillance of an individual and not mass or wholesale surveillance); Maynard, 615
F.3d at 557-58 (urging that Knotts is not controlling in cases of prolonged warrantless
surveillance of an individual).
69. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
70. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557 (rejecting the government’s argument that
Knotts refers to any and all movement of a vehicle in public).
71. See id. at 558.
72. See id. at 556-57 (explaining that the roughly hundred-mile journey in Knotts is
critically different from highly invasive prolonged monitoring).
73. See Brief for Appellants at 53-68, United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3030), 2009 WL 3155141, at *39-47.
74. Id. at *41 (classifying the capabilities of the beeper discussed in Knotts and the
GPS device at issue in Maynard).
75. Id.
76. See id. at *56-58 (explaining the superiority of surveillance capability of the
GPS device compared to a beeper).
77. See Tied up in Knotts?, supra note 14, at 453-54 (“To suggest that the
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Maynard presents the opportunity for the Supreme Court to examine the
issue specifically reserved in Knotts.78 The discrete nature of the
monitoring and the use of a less advanced surveillance device make Knotts
an incompatible precedent for cases involving prolonged warrantless GPS
tracking.79 A Supreme Court affirmation of the holding in Maynard will
signal to both state and federal courts that Knotts is not precedent in cases
involving warrantless prolonged monitoring by law enforcement.80
B. The Supreme Court Should Affirm the D.C. Circuit Court’s Decision
Because the Warrantless Use of a GPS Tracker Constituted an
Unreasonable Search as Jones Had a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
in the Whole of His Movements over a Month, and Society is Willing to
Accept This Expectation as Reasonable.
Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence dictates that courts undertake a
Katz analysis to determine whether a search was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.81 The two-prong test dictates that Fourth Amendment
protections apply when an individual has both an objectively and
subjectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her actions.82 The
D.C. Circuit Court used the mosaic theory to establish that Jones had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his aggregated whereabouts for the
month that he was under surveillance.83 The court then turned to the
second prong of the Katz test and relied on state law trends and specific
state cases to find an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.84 The
unfettered use of GPS-enabled tracking is contemplated by the Court’s decisions in
Katz and Knotts ignores this critical element of Fourth Amendment analysis.”).
78. Cf. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556-57 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting
the Supreme Court’s reservation of the issue of prolonged monitoring in Knotts), cert.
granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 101259).
79. See id. at 556-58 (holding that Knotts applies to cases involving discrete
monitoring and not to cases involving wholesale surveillance); Brief for Appellants at
56-58, United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3030), 2009
WL 3155141 at *56-58 (comparing the superior technological capabilities of a GPS
device to a beeper).
80. Cf. Savage, supra note 11 (hypothesizing a Supreme Court review of Maynard
due to the contradicting decisions of lower courts).
81. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(creating the two-part test for reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in terms of
Fourth Amendment protections).
82. Id.
83. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562-63 (using the mosaic theory to conclude that
collective movements reveal more than discrete trips and that an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their collective movements).
84. See id. at 563-64 (holding that the action of the state legislatures, specific state
cases, and the highly invasive nature of a GPS search indicate that society would be
willing to recognize Jones’ expectation of privacy in his collective movements as
reasonable).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss4/18

12

FORD 9/25/2011

10/6/2011 12:52:22 PM

Ford: Mosaic Theory and the Fourth Amendment: How Jones Can Save Privac

2011]

MOSAIC THEORY AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

1363

presence of an objectively and subjectively reasonable expectation of
privacy implicated Fourth Amendment protections and required the court to
reverse Jones’ conviction as the GPS tracking constituted an unreasonable
search.85
1. The D.C. Circuit Court Correctly Held That Jones Had a Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy in the Whole of His Movements over a Month
Because His Movements Were Not Exposed to the Public in Light of the
Mosaic Theory.
The D.C. Circuit Court correctly held that Jones had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the totality of his movements twenty-four hours a
day for twenty-eight days.86 Maynard expressly presents the issue of
whether wholesale surveillance of an individual requires a warrant.87 The
court successfully used the mosaic theory to establish that Jones had a
reasonable expectation of privacy from such surveillance.88
The first prong of the Katz test addresses whether an individual has
exposed information to the public and what that individual can reasonably
expect others to do with that information.89 Jones’ movements in his
vehicle may have been on public roads, but the likelihood that another
individual would observe all of his movements is effectively nil.90
Maynard is consistent with Supreme Court precedent because, while an
individual may be able to gather the information, the fact that a reasonable
person would not expect another to record his collective and prolonged
movements preserves the expectation of privacy.91
The Supreme Court has previously reviewed and upheld government use
of the mosaic theory to protect collective information.92 While the
85. See id. at 568 (recognizing that without the evidence obtained through
warrantless police use of GPS data, the evidence was insufficient).
86. See id. at 558 (differentiating the recording of the totality of one’s movements
from piecemeal tracking).
87. See id. at 557-58 (distinguishing other circuit courts that have preserved the
constitutional limits to GPS tracking).
88. See id. at 562 (justifying a reasonable expectation of privacy in collective
movements under the mosaic theory).
89. See United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (explaining that a
reasonable expectation of privacy depends on the degree to which an individual
exposes information to the public).
90. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559-60 (describing that Jones did not actually expose
his movements to the public).
91. Compare Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 344, 338-39 (2000) (holding that a
bus passenger has a reasonable expectation that his bag will not be felt in an
exploratory manner, even though the bag is in a public space), with Maynard, 615 F.3d
at 560 (contending that an individual has a reasonable expectation that his prolonged
and continuous movements, while they may be in a public area, will not be observed).
92. See Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory & Government Attitude, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 845, 851-52 (2006) (explaining that the decision in CIA v. Sims, 471
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government originally used the mosaic theory to defeat the rationale for the
Freedom of Information Act, it has expanded the use of the theory to justify
closing deportation hearings, indefinitely detaining non-citizens, and
searching certain records.93 Judges have extended extreme deference to the
government in many instances when the government has asserted the
mosaic theory as a justification for intelligence secrecy.94 Scholars note
that even though the government often provides little evidence in support
of the mosaic theory aside from vague national security claims, judges
frequently side with the government for fear of “unknown
vulnerabilities.”95 Mosaic theory cases emphasize the critical value of
collective information and evidence a judicial fear of discrete pieces of
information compromising the collective.96
The fear of the unknown value of collective information should also
protect an individual’s fundamental right to privacy from highly intrusive
government searches.97 Just as judges refused to allow the diffusion of
discrete pieces of information in the name of unknown national security
interests, they should also protect the value of an individual’s collective
information.98 Individual privacy, like national security, is a critical aspect
of free society and warrants heightened protection for collective
information.99
The mosaic theory of information aligns real world expectations about
privacy with the rule of law.100 GPS technology enables law enforcement
to conduct surveillance that would be too expensive to collect using other
U.S. 159 (1985), constituted the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the mosaic theory to
protect government information).
93. See id. at 869-70 (describing the broad scope of activities in which the
government invokes the mosaic theory to keep activities private).
94. See id. at 852-55 (arguing that judges, fearing national security implications,
showed extreme deference to the government in allowing it to protect non-classified
information).
95. See Pozen, supra note 56, at 653-54 (suggesting that judges protect the
government).
96. See, e.g., Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“We must take
into account, however, that each individual piece of intelligence information, much like
a piece of jigsaw puzzle, may aid in piecing together other bits of information even
when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself.”).
97. Cf. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (using the
mosaic theory to protect an individual’s expectation of privacy in his collective
movements from unwarranted police surveillance), cert. granted sub nom. United
States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259).
98. See, e.g., Halperin, 629 F.2d at 150 (justifying the protection of CIA legal bills
under the theory that someone could combine them with other discrete information to
uncover covert CIA transactions).
99. Id.
100. See Sanchez, supra note 59 (positing that the mosaic theory of information and
privacy is preferable to an analysis which assumes that the sum of “public” facts must
always be itself a public fact).
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methods.101 The massive amounts of data accumulated by GPS devices,
when viewed collectively, provides a highly detailed profile of an
individual, including not only where he or she goes, but also his or her
political, religious, professional, and romantic associations.102
An
individual reasonably expects his or her movements to be disconnected and
anonymous, and the intimate portrait of his or her life that police are able to
compile through continuous monitoring, undermines that reasonable
expectation of privacy.103
The mosaic theory is a novel theory in the Fourth Amendment context
and it could dramatically change privacy jurisprudence.104 Legal scholars
have been promoting the mosaic theory, which some refer to as the
“aggregation effect,” as a new way to think about personal information in
the digital age.105 The flexibility of the mosaic theory provides advantages
to courts because the test can adapt to evolving technology in a way that
other tests would be unable to do.106
The significant strength of the theory is also its biggest weakness: judges
measure a search not by whether a particular individual act is a search but
by whether the collective conduct amounts to a search.107 This presents
concern because no bright line rule exists that would distinguish a nonsearch from a search when examining data collected by a GPS tracking
device.108 Maynard differs from Knotts in that Knotts involved a single,
101. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007).
102. See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (warning of the

highly detailed picture that an individual GPS surveillance captures).
103. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (positing
that continuous tracking reveals more than any individual reasonably expects others to
know), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011)
(No. 10-1259).
104. See Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces “Mosaic Theory” of Fourth
Amendment, Holds GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuitintroduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-monitoring-a-fourthamendment-search/ (suggesting that examining the Fourth Amendment in light of
collective activity would change Fourth Amendment analysis).
105. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN
THE DIGITAL AGE 44 (2004) (detailing the “aggregation effect,” which explains that
“[i]nformation that appears innocuous can sometimes be the missing link . . . or the key
necessary to unlock other stores of personal information.”).
106. See Sanchez, supra note 59 (“[E]specially as technology makes such
aggregative monitoring more of a live concern—some kind of shift to a ‘mosaic’ view
of privacy is going to be necessary to preserve the practical guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment, just as in the twentieth century a shift from a wholly property-centric to a
more expectations-based theory was needed to prevent remote sensing technologies
from gutting its protections.”).
107. See id. (noting the lack of a specific rule that would distinguish non-searches
from searches).
108. See id. (contemplating the absence of a boundary for the scope and duration of
activity which would constitute a search requiring judicial approval from that which
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discrete trip where Maynard involved prolonged monitoring.109 The court
neglected to articulate the bright line between a single discrete trip and a
month of continuous monitoring.110
The mosaic theory supports Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy in
the totality of his movements for the month during which he was under
warrantless surveillance.111 While the mosaic theory is not without flaws,
further judicial development of the theory’s Fourth Amendment
implications will likely resolve these issues.112 The flexibility of the
mosaic theory provides a standard that is capable of addressing individual
privacy concerns in the face of rapidly advancing surveillance
technology.113
2. The D.C. Circuit Court Correctly Held That Jones’ Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy in the Whole of His Movements over the Period of a
Month is One Which Society is Prepared to Accept as Reasonable, as
Evidenced by State Legislation and Specific State Cases.
The D.C. Circuit Court, in examining Maynard under the second prong
of the Katz test, correctly held that society would recognize Jones’
expectation of privacy as reasonable.114 To determine what society is
willing to accept as reasonable, courts must look to societal norms, the law
of previous judges, and legislative intent.115 The movement of state
legislatures towards providing protection from warrantless police use of
GPS tracking devices is a strong indication of the fact that society agrees
that this type of intrusion violates an expectation of privacy.116 State court
would not).
109. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(differentiating the privacy expectations in a discrete trip compared to the totality of an
individual’s continuous movements), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones,
131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259).
110. See Kerr, supra note 104 (“One-month of surveillance is too long, the court
says. But how about 2 weeks? 1 week? 1 day? 1 hour?”).
111. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562-63 (using the mosaic theory to satisfy the first
prong of the Katz test and to establish a subjective reasonable expectation of privacy).
112. See Sanchez, supra note 59 (addressing the flaws of the mosaic theory but
positing that the theory remains workable regardless).
113. See id. (lauding the flexibility of the mosaic theory in terms of addressing
privacy concerns of evolving technology).
114. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563-64; see also Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (noting the requirement that society views the privacy
expectation as reasonable).
115. See Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy” Test, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (discussing how judges determine
the objective expectation of privacy).
116. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-15.5 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing that an
investigative or law enforcement officer needs a court order to install any mobile
tracking device and stating that the there must be specifically granted authority to
attach a tracking device to any area in which there exists a reasonable expectation of
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cases also indicate a trend toward judicial acceptance of an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality of individuals’ prolonged
movements in their automobile.117 Therefore, warrantless GPS monitoring
defeats an expectation of privacy.118
Additionally, requiring a warrant for law enforcement use of GPS
devices is consistent with existing societal norms.119 A recent survey of
societal privacy concerns relating to location-indicating programs on
cellular telephones revealed that individuals believed that risks associated
with the use of such technology outweighed the benefits.120 These results
indicate society’s unease with the intrusiveness of GPS tracking in public
and private areas, as well as the fear of government abuse of the
technology.121
Applying the mosaic theory to Maynard strengthens the argument that
society would be willing to accept Jones’ expectation of privacy as
reasonable.122 Maynard and similar state cases differ from the decisions in
Garcia, Marquez, and Pineda-Moreno because those decisions did not
recognize the distinction between discrete and collective information in
Knotts.123 Societal expectations of privacy will inevitably change based on
the nature of a prolonged search and the mosaic of an individual that the

privacy).
117. See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1201 (N.Y. 2009) (noting that law
enforcement must obtain warrants before installing and using GPS devices);
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369-70 (Mass. 2009) (holding that GPS
installation constituted a seizure); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 221 (Wash. 2003)
(deciding that using a GPS device amounted to a search).
118. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (concluding that an objective expectation of
privacy exists).
119. See Tied up in Knotts?, supra note 14, at 459 (arguing that requiring a warrant
is consistent with existing norms and the free society envisioned by the Framers).
120. See Janice Y. Tsai et al., Location-Sharing Technologies: Privacy Risks and
Controls, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 119, 138-40, 145 (2010) (revealing that
perceived risks of location sharing technology outweighed the benefits, such as finding
individuals in an emergency or tracking missing children).
121. See id. at 145 (reporting that individuals in the survey expressed that both a fear
of being tracked by the government and the overall lack of privacy as harms associated
with GPS programs in cellular telephones).
122. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (warning that “prolonged GPS monitoring
reveals an intimate picture of the subject’s life that he expects no one to have . . .”).
123. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (explicitly reserving the
issue of prolonged surveillance stating that if such collective surveillance eventually
occurs, the court may then determine whether alternate constitutional principles apply).
Compare Maynard, 615 F.3d at 666-56 (recognizing that Knotts was inapplicable
because it involved limited surveillance), with United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 491
F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that under Knotts, surveillance for a
reasonable period of time was not a search), and People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195,
1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“Constant, relentless tracking of anything is now not merely
possible but entirely practicable, indeed much more practicable than the surveillance
conduced in Knotts.”).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011

17

FORD 9/25/2011

10/6/2011 12:52:22 PM

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 18

1368

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 19:4

collective information creates for law enforcement.124 Citizens do not
reasonably expect that the government will track their continuous
whereabouts without a warrant in order to create a highly detailed mosaic
of their lives.125
The sociological data, combined with the activity in state court and state
legislatures, signals society’s fear of warrantless GPS tracking.126 These
factors indicate that Jones had an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in the totality of his movements for the month he was under
warrantless surveillance.127 Therefore, warrantless GPS tracking in
Maynard constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment as
Jones had a subjectively and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy
in the totality of his movements for a month.128
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A Supreme Court affirmation of warrantless police use of GPS tracking
to create detailed mosaics of individuals will change residents’ relationship
with the government.129 Recent reports of warrantless government GPS
tracking confirm the suspicions of the Maynard court.130 Several recent
stories illuminate how the government’s use of GPS tracking specifically
targets Muslim-Americans in the wake in 9/11.131
Yasir Afifi, a U.S. citizen and California resident, with an Egyptian-born
father, was having his oil changed when his mechanic found a rectangular

124. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 (“The difference is not one of degree but of kind,
for no single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the distinction between a
day in the life and a way of life.”).
125. See Tied up in Knotts?, supra note 14, at 459 (noting that if GPS tracking is
deemed a non-search then individuals will be forced to assume that the government is
tracking them at any time).
126. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-15.5 (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring a court
order to install a GPS device); Tsai, supra note 120, at 145 (observing individuals’ fear
of government abuse of GPS).
127. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 564 (using various factors to conclude that society
would interpret privacy in the totality of an individual’s movements for the period of a
month as a reasonable).
128. See id. at 568 (deciding that the warrantless GPS tracking violated Jones’
Fourth Amendment rights).
129. See Tied up in Knotts?, supra note 14, at 459 (positing that warrantless GPS
tracking by the government would significantly alter the current relationship between
citizens and the government because of the level of intrusion and the privacy interest in
collective details).
130. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 (acknowledging the detailed picture, including
religious and cultural information, that the government obtains by prolonged
warrantless GPS tracking).
131. See, e.g., Mina Kim, FBI’s GPS Tracking Raises Privacy Concerns, NPR (Oct.
27, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130833487 (detailing
two recent GPS tracking incidents in California against Muslim-Americans).
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device attached to the undercarriage of the automobile.132 Afifi posted
pictures of the device on an online forum, where posters indicated that it
was a GPS tracking device.133 Soon after, four armed FBI agents
approached Afifi, demanding that he return the device as it was federal
property.134 The FBI confirmed that it had placed the GPS device on
Afifi’s vehicle, but did not indicate why the government was investigating
Afifi.135 Comments made by the FBI agents indicated that Afifi was under
surveillance for three to six months.136
Abdo Alwareeth, another California resident, claims that a similar
situation occurred two years ago when he found a GPS device on his
vehicle while taking an auto-mechanics class.137 Alwareeth, a U.S. citizen
originally from Yemen, cannot understand why, after forty years living in
the United States, the government targeted him.138 Alwareeth and his wife
now live in constant fear of FBI surveillance and check their vehicles daily
for additional tracking devices.139
Zahra Billoo, the head of the local chapter of the Council on AmericanIslamic Relations, explains that this type of FBI activity creates a rift
between the government and American-Islamic communities by frightening
these communities.140 Billoo also reported that two Ohio residents recently
found similar tracking devices on their vehicles.141
The most frightening aspect of these incidents is not the actual devices
found, but the likelihood that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies
are conducting warrantless GPS surveillance on unsuspecting residents.142
The opinions of the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts deny any
protection to individuals from the government’s warrantless use of GPS
tracking even in situations such as these where the individuals were
religiously or ethnically targeted.143 Muslims in the United States face
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Davi Barker, Who Needs a Warrant . . . He’s Muslim!, EXAMINER.COM (Oct. 8,

2010, 9:23 PM), http://www.examiner.com/muslim-in-san-francisco/who-needs-awarrant-he-s-muslim.
135. Kim, supra note 131.
136. Kim Zetter, Caught Spying on Student, FBI Demands GPS Tracker Back,
WIRED
THREAT
LEVEL
BLOG
(Oct.
7,
2010,
10:13
PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/10/fbi-tracking-device/.
137. Kim, supra note 131.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id. (referring to the Islamic American and Arab American communities).
141. Zetter, supra note 136.
142. Cf. Barker, supra note 134 (asserting that it is highly unusual that Afifi’s device
was found at all and implying that most GPS devices of this nature will not be found).
143. Cf. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010)
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growing discrimination in post-9/11 America.144 As the attitude in the
United States continues to become increasingly negative towards Muslims,
it is critical that warrants be required in order to prevent “Islamophobia”
from infiltrating law enforcement practices.145
A Supreme Court
affirmation of Maynard would provide a basic level of protection for
Muslim-Americans, as it would require a minimum of probable cause for
the government to use a GPS tracking device.146
V. CONCLUSION
Individual privacy is a fundamental right and directly involves the ability
to prevent the collection and circulation of personal information.147 The
current Supreme Court privacy framework fails to account for the level of
intrusion occasioned by advanced technology and how its use undermines
privacy protections.148 Knotts should not control cases involving the
continuous monitoring with GPS devices, as the case dealt with a discrete
journey and specifically did not address the issue of prolonged
surveillance.149 A warrantless police beeper used for a one hundred-mile
trip and warrantless GPS tracking for a month or more are not equivalent

(holding that the warrantless use of a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s automobile
was not a search); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010)
(deciding that the warrantless use of a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s automobile
did not constitute a search); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007)
(analogizing GPS tracking to surveillance cameras and satellite imaging).
144. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Muslims Report Rising Discrimination at Work,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010 at B1 (illustrating the rise in reported incidents of
discrimination against Muslims in the workplace and noting the sixty percent increase
from 2005 to 2009 in claims).
145. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., NYC MOSQUE OPPOSED, MUSLIMS’ RIGHT TO BUILD
MOSQUES FAVORED: PUBLIC REMAINS CONFLICTED OVER ISLAM (2010), available at
http://pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious_Affiliation/Muslim/Islammosque-full-report.pdf (providing statistical support for the assertion that public
opinion in America has become increasingly unfavorable towards Muslims, even since
ON
AMERICAN-ISLAMIC
RELATIONS,
2005);
Islamophobia,
COUNCIL
http://www.cair.com/Issues/Islamophobia/Islamophobia.aspx (last visited Feb. 17,
2011) (defining Islamophobia in the United States as the fear of and hostility towards
Islam which relates to the discriminatory treatment of Muslims).
146. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that
Fourth Amendment protections require the government to obtain a warrant before using
a GPS tracking device), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064
(June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259).
147. See SOLOVE, supra note 105, at 51 (equating the collection of personal
information without an individual’s knowledge to powerlessness).
148. See Renée McDonald Hutchins, The Anatomy of a Search: Intrusiveness and
the Fourth Amendment, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1185, 1187-88 (2010) (advocating that the
Supreme Court modify its privacy analysis to better protect privacy as technology
evolves).
149. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (explicitly reserving the
issue of mass surveillance for another time).
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surveillance techniques and implicate separate privacy issues.150 As
surveillance technology continues to evolve, the Supreme Court must
reevaluate its reliance on Knotts, and United States v. Jones presents the
ideal opportunity for the Court to do so.151
The mosaic theory, while novel as a justification for Fourth Amendment
protection, provides a practical alternative for privacy analysis that is
flexible enough to adapt to developing technologies.152 Just as the
government has successfully used the theory to protect the unknown value
of collective information, citizens too, should be able to use this rationale
to protect the unknown value of personal collective information.153 The
adoption of the mosaic theory and the rejection of warrantless GPS
searches by police have significant implications for the future of individual
privacy and technology.154
For example, built in vehicular GPS systems, which used to be present
exclusively in luxury car models, are now prevalent in a large variety of
standard vehicles.155 These built in “concierge systems,” such as OnStar,
allow police officers to monitor the past and present location of these
vehicles without installing a tracking device.156 For police, this eliminates
issues of whether the installation of the tracking device constituted a
search.157 A Supreme Court decision, allowing warrantless GPS tracking,
could imply that law enforcement agencies do not need a warrant to collect
information from built in GPS systems, which some state courts have
150. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556-57 (rejecting Knotts as a controlling case
because of the differences in technology and the nature of the privacy interest at stake).
151. Cf. Tied up in Knotts?, supra note 14, at 453-54 (“Where the sophistication of
GPS technology permits the pinpoint tracking of persons (not just vehicles), the overly
broad application of Knotts allows a substantial encroachment upon personal privacy
that was clearly not envisioned by the Knotts Court.”).
152. See Sanchez, supra note 59 (lauding the mosaic theory’s flexibility as opposed
to the current privacy analysis regime).
153. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 (utilizing the mosaic theory to find that an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality of their movements
over a prolonged period); Pozen, supra note 56, at 653-54 (noting the government’s use
of the mosaic theory to protect the uncertain value of collective information in secrecy
cases).
154. See Sanchez, supra note 59 (arguing that the mosaic theory of privacy will be
necessary in order to prevent Fourth Amendment protections from becoming obsolete
in the face of advancing technology).
155. See Donald W. Garland & Carol M. Bast, Is the Government Riding Shotgun?
Recent Changes in Automobile Technology and the Right to Privacy, 46 CRIM. L.
BULL. 295 (2010) (opining that technological advances in recent years have lead to
more cars being built with GPS and concierge systems).
156. See id. (arguing that concierge systems in automobiles potentially allow law
enforcement tracking and eavesdropping capabilities).
157. See id. (proposing that because car manufacturers include GPS systems in
vehicles, individuals would only have the opportunity to contest law enforcement’s use
of the previously installed GPS devices).
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already found to be a less invasive procedure.158
It is likely that the Court’s decision will also impact future court cases
involving a multitude of location sharing devices such as cellular phones,
laptops, and other mobile devices.159 The Electronic Communications Act
governs cell phone tracking and requires law enforcement to obtain a court
order in order to obtain information about a person’s location.160 Lower
courts lack a consensus on the issue of whether these orders require
probable cause or simply an articulable facts standard.161 Supreme Court
affirmation of the Maynard decision would send a clear signal to law
enforcement that a warrant is required to use an individual’s technological
devices to determine his or her location.162
The Fourth Amendment protects privacy in the relationship between the
government and citizens.163 While the Court has shifted from a property
and trespass regime of privacy evaluation, the current conceptualization of
the Fourth Amendment fails to adapt to technological advances and
changing society.164
Privacy jurisprudence must evolve to shield
individuals’ lives and social practices as well as information that relates to
humans’ basic needs and desires from inappropriate police uses of
advanced technology.165 The mosaic theory provides a workable option
that accommodates modern technology and allows adjustments to privacy
jurisprudence.

158. See id. (explaining that the court, in United States v. Coleman, No. 07-20357,
2008 WL 495323 (E.D. Mich. 2008), found that the police were not required to install
an additional tracking device because using the existing built in device was less
invasive).
159. See Adam Koppel, Warranting a Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns
Raised By Law Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking,
64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1069 (2010) (noting the need for Fourth Amendment
guidance in light of the advances in mobile technology, such as cell phones).
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006) (detailing the lawful procedure for intercepting
electronic communications).
161. See Koppel, supra note 159, at 1080-83 (exposing the courts’ inconsistent
requirements for court orders).
162. Cf. id. at 1089 (advocating that the Supreme Court address the issue of the
warrant requirement in cases of GPS and cellular telephone tracking).
163. See SOLOVE, supra note 105, at 191 (referencing Orwell’s and Kafka’s
propositions that government intrusions into the privacy of an individual prevent
freedom and well-being).
164. See id. at 190 (arguing that while the Court has adjusted the privacy framework
from a property based philosophy, the current jurisprudence is too narrow to afford the
larger Fourth Amendment protections).
165. See id. at 191 (proposing that privacy must protect individuals’ lives where
judgment is particularly abrasive and in areas of our basic needs including sexuality,
entertainment, political activity, and family).
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